Wrong. Roxio, a CD-burning software company, snapped up the Napster name and the technical assets of Shawn Fanning's file-sharing startup on the cheap. But sometimes you get what you pay for. Roxio shed its software business and took the Napster name, but never figured out how to profit from it. In the last year, it lost $16.5 million.

And yet Napster managed to live on. If anyone can lay it in the ground once and for all, we're betting it's Best Buy. The retailer has stumbled from one unsuccessful online-music strategy to another, most recently through a partnership with RealNetworks' also-ran music site, Rhapsody. Why doesn't Best Buy just ask Steve Jobs for more iPods to sell? That seems easier.

Previously:

• A is for Adelson, who cofounded Digg


• B is for Botha, who sold YouTube big


• F is for Fitzpatrick, and "hookers and blow"


• L is for Levchin, who never goes slow

This news only dwindles even further the value of Yahoo's subscription music service, which its reportedly been trying to offload for around $90 million. Why won't that happen? The most likely buyer, Napster, doesn't have even that much cash lying around. RealNetworks could buy it, but they're more focused on their booming mobile business right now. Or at least they should be.

The only serious potential buyers are RealNetworks, though they may have fallen out of buyout talks already, and Napster, which continues to perform poorly and just recently began to shift its strategy away from subscriptions, too. Getting out of the subscription business is probably a necessary move for Yahoo, but the company may just have to settle for mothballing the operation. Good riddance.

Not because Apple's position is unassailable. Not because the music studios are lethargic and notoriously bad at building technology — never mind technology that can reach every platform and device and properly share revenue amongst all artists and labels involved. There are more fundamental problems.

The first problem is thinking that consumers will see this as free and embrace it. Cell-phone carriers, Internet providers, and gadgetmakers are expected to bake the subsidy into the cost of what they are providing. The users, who haven't taken to paying for their own music subscriptions, will see this for what it is. Devices keep getting cheaper. Consumers won't pay extra for an MP3 player, particularly if they only want to play the music they already own. A $5 increase to a monthly cell-phone bill will clearly come across as an additional charge. Users are also likely to have more than one device or service with these additional fees attached. Won't they, inevitably, see this as the music industry double- or triple-dipping?

Secondly, the entire cost burden is placed on the providers. Morris hopes they'll happily accept this arrangement because they'll see the benefit of increased sales. But if every device and service can provide the offering, why would any one player see increased sales? They won't — just increased costs. Morris has proposed tacking on an extra $90 to the cost of a gadget. Microsoft may have caved to a smaller subsidy for its Zune, but no one will accept a $90 subsidy that gains them no advantage.

Morris's Total Music plan sounds like the all-encompassing strategy that the music industry should have had before Napster emerged nearly a decade ago. With a venture called Pressplay, now owned (ironically) by the reborn Napster, Universal has already tried its hand at digital music and failed. Morris has come up with a plan that benefits his industry, not the consumer and not the technology business. By thinking big, he's just made it clear how small his company's role in digital music is doomed to be.